Bilateral trade deals will prevail as long as multilateralism hobbles, says Swiss-India commerce chamber boss

At the opening of the Swiss-Indian Chamber of Commerce’s (SICC) Geneva office, in the city’s banking district in mid-August, trade and business delegates expressed a sigh of relief on receiving some good news.  Trade negotiations with the United States had just floundered, resulting in a steep 39 per cent tariff rate on Swiss exports. As the local economy also grapples with reduced spending from a crisis-hit international Geneva, some businesses can at least look east towards brighter trade prospects with the world’s most populated country.

The new outpost of the Zurich-based chamber, which promotes cultural and economic ties between Switzerland and India, coincides with a regional trade pact with the south Asian state that comes into force on 1 October. For Philippe Reich, an international trade lawyer and SICC chair, its Geneva presence will help provide a lending hand to Swiss businesses in the region looking to expand into a still relatively untapped market – only one per cent of Swiss exports – while forging closer diplomatic ties at a time when India is increasing its presence on the multilateral stage.

Geneva Solutions: The Swiss-Indian Chamber of Commerce already has its headquarters in Zurich. Why open a presence here in Geneva?

Philippe Reich: SICC celebrates its 40th anniversary this year. It’s always been our ambition to open other regional clusters.  It was clear to me that to truly represent companies across the country, we could not only be Swiss-German based.  We have a few companies based in the Lake Geneva region,who are already SICC members, but have lost members precisely because we were not based in the French part of Switzerland. Recently, the Geneva Chamber of Commerce and Industry offered to host us. They already host the bilateral Chinese and American chambers of commerce, so we really saw this as a perfect opportunity. The Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) signed in 2024 between India and the European Free Trade Association, whose members include Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway, was also a catalyst for raising interest in India among Swiss companies based in the region particularly around Geneva, and made for a business case to do this now.

Did the fact that Geneva hosts the World Trade Organization and is a key multilateral hub play a role in the decision?

It was not the primary driver for the chamber. But the fact that India in the past few years has ramped up its presence at the WTO and the UN does provide an extra incentive to be in Geneva. To be meaningful and credible, both in the private and public sector, you need to be present in key hubs.

We have always had strong relations with the Indian Embassy in Bern and discussions at an intergovernmental level are going to be important now in terms of implementing the TEPA.  India’s permanent mission in Geneva has also received a mandate to ensure that this agreement works.

After the tariff debacle with the United States, what lessons can Switzerland draw from its recent success with TEPA in trying to improve its deal?

There is a certain irony because it’s the same team (that concluded both deals). The initial offer that Switzerland made to the US – investments and jobs – and the Team Switzerland (as a public-private partnership) approach was indeed a copy paste of the ultimately successful TEPA game plan.

Negotiations with India got off to a similar start with concerns about the trade balance, also distorted by gold exports, and what a small country like Switzerland could bring to the table. But then the focus shifted to what Switzerland could offer in terms of innovation and in growing India’s manufacturing base, with a commitment from EFTA states to invest $100bn and create one million jobs in India over the next 15 years.

Have trade agreements with countries like India become more significant in light of the huge jump in US tariffs?

Swiss companies must and are now seeking alternatives. India also comes into play here, even more so than before the US issue became a factor. Switzerland is one of the countries with the largest number of free trade agreements and knows how to apply them successfully. It has always had to look at new markets – over 80 per cent of its economy is exports – due to the Swiss and European markets being largely saturated. But now with the onset of new 39 per cent import tariffs into the US that smaller companies in particular cannot afford, there is an extra incentive for companies that haven’t done so already to turn to other markets like India. Increased economic uncertainty around the Chinese market, and geopolitical tensions between US and China – and not to forget about Russia, North Korea and Iran – are also increasing the attractiveness of other markets such as India.

We’re seeing an intense period of bilateral trade deals – what is the danger of these for the multilateral policy space?

First, there is no other way. The WTO’s blocked appellate body is a contributing factor, with many nations seeking alternative mechanisms to resolve trade disputes, including bilateral and plurilateral deals. Interestingly, statistics show that most cases (caught in the appeals system) have the US and China on either side, so they are still using the system to play against each other while not accepting the outcome.

We are also seeing a build-up of regional agreements which traditionally involved countries on the same continent but now suddenly you have the UK who joined the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership at the end of 2024 and even Switzerland considering such moves. This network of bilateral and plurilateral deals is building, but of course they have to be compliant with WTO rules. It’s a reality, with countries like India realising that they need to be part of the global supply chain, with a focus now on Europe to avoid the risk of being left out.

It’s not ideal, but like what we see at the UN Security Council, you have big powers, now even the US, blocking the proper functioning of international institutions and organisations in international trade. That is why you have small countries like Switzerland, as well as the largest like India, advocating for multilateralism. Meanwhile, they have no other choice but to play the bilateral game similarly to other countries. They don’t have the power to impose conditions on other countries, not even India, yet. To achieve its ambitious growth agenda, namely to become a fully developed country by 2047, India needs foreign investors and needs to open its market for them.

India has been playing an increasingly influential, yet disruptive, role at the WTO, blocking negotiating processes like on agriculture and fisheries subsidies. How does this fit into what you’ve observed in its broader trade and foreign policy?

India has the ambition to be a global power. Over the last few years, the government has made a push to claim the global stage and to show that the world is not just bipolar, led by the US and China, but also includes India, which has its own voice. It’s saying: “No one tells us what to do or whose side we are on”. India has also been positioning itself as the voice of the global south at trade and other negotiations, where it challenges China, which also claims this role.

What future role do you see for the WTO?

I really hope that the WTO reclaims its significance but right now, it doesn’t look like that. It would take the big powers – the US, or China – to consider themselves bound to the organisation and part of multilateral negotiating rounds like we had in the past. Groups of countries are forming within the WTO, Switzerland included, but again these are fragmented.